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Some Recent Developments in Canadian 
Constitutional Theory with Particular 
Reference to Beatty and Hutchinson 
Richard F. Devlin 
This article provides a critique of recent books by two prominent Canadian con­
stitutional theorists - David Beatty's Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice 
and Allan Hutchinson's Waiting for CORAF: A Critique of Law and Rights. 
Devlin begins with a brief overview of the various positions that have been staked out 
in writing on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freed oms during the last decade. 
He identifies three broad constituencies: Charter advocates who assume that rights are 
an "unqualified human good" and that judicial review is an important check on 
majoritarian zealotry; Charter critics who emphasize the undemocratic nature of 
judicial review and who doubt the beneficence of a rights-dominated regime; and 
"progressive deviationists" who are somewhat nervous of both rights discourse and 
judicial review but who seek to make the best of an imperfect set of constitutional 
institutions. According to Devlin, Beatty and Hutchinson represent the first and 
second of these positions, Beatty being a fervent advocate of the Charter and judicial 
review and Hutchinson an unapologetic crtitic of both. Beatty argues that a 
constitution can insulate basic rights from contamination by the contingencies of 
politics, and that the courts should use the principles of rationality and 
proportionality, rather than perceptions of legislative intent, in scrutinizing 
government action for compliance with the constitution. Hutchinson, in contrast, 
argues for what he calls a dialogic model, maintaining that because political decision­
making is rooted in electoral democracy, it is more legitimate than judicial decision­
making. Devlin places himself closer to Hutchinson than to Beatty, but he questions 
the ability of Hutchinson's dialogic model to provide a sufficient means to move from 
rights talk and social inequality to democratic and social equality. 
•:• Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School. Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, 
McGill University (1995-1996). I would like to thank several anonymous reviewers 
for their critical assessments. A special debt is owed to Helene Lajeunesse. 
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Introduction 
In an article published at roughly the same time as the Charter1 
came into force, Rod MacDonald lamented that "the summer of 
1982 will undoubtedly be remembered for the quiescence of 
Canadian legal theorists."2 In the ensuing 14 years the scene has 
changed dramatically. There are a large number of Canadian schol­
ars who approach law, and in particular constitutional law, in an 
explicitly jurisprudential fashion, and they have produced an almost 
unmanageable body of work. Much of it, in my opinion, is of very 
good quality.3 
In the course of 1995, the University of Toronto Press published 
books by two of the most prodigious constitutional theorists of the 
last 15 years: David Beatty's Constitutional Law in Theory and 
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. 
2. R.A. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude-The Jurisprudence of the Charter: 
Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 321 at 321. 
3. For an attempt to provide an overall assessment of this body of scholarship see 
R.F. Devlin, "The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory" (1997) 4 Rev. Con. Stud. 
[forthcoming] [hereinafter "Anglophone Legal Theory"]. 
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Practice4 and Allan Hutchinson's Waiting for Coraf A Critique of 
Law and Rights.5 Each book is an attempt by the author to pull to­gether in one volume much of their scholarship on constitutiona­
lism over the last decade or so, and to hone, refine and clarify some 
of their earlier work. Both succeed quite admirably. These are not 
simply collections of previously published essays vaguely held to­
gether by some superficial preface. Rather, they are serious attempts 
by Beatty and Hutchinson to provide coherent and sustained argu­
ments in pursuit of their own constitutional visions. Both books are 
provocative and generate reflection and engagement; both appeal to 
certain deep seated constitutional sensibilities and yet both seem 
flawed - each is passionately argued but somehow they both come 
across as being somewhat 'over the top'. Because of these strengths 
and weaknesses they provide us with an opportunity to take a snap­
shot of the state of contemporary Canadian constitutional theori­
zmg. 
This review essay will first attempt to locate each of the authors in 
the broader constitutional theoretical 'langscape'.6 Secondly, I will 
outline and then assess the persuasiveness of the arguments of each 
of the authors. Finally, I will offer some tentative conclusions. It 
should be noted at the outset that the ambitions of this essay are 
very modest. There is no attempt to suggest that I have a better con­
stitutional theory to offer; this should not be read as a ground-clea­
ring prolegomenon for some new vision. What follows is an una­
pologetic (but hopefully constructive) critique. 
4 .  D. Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1995) [hereinafter Theory and Practice]. 
5. A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf A Critique of Laws and Rights (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995) [hereinafter Cora/]. 
6. For further discussion of legal "langscapes" see J. Youngblood Henderson, 
"Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada" (1995) 18 Dalhousie L.J. 196 at 205. 
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I. The Debate Over the Legitimacy of 
Judicial Review and the 
Constitutional Entrenchment of a 
Charter of Rights 
While it is true that debates about the legitimacy of judicial review 
predate the Charter, there is little doubt that concerns about this 
issue have taken on a particular urgency among academics in the 
last 15 years. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere,7 the focus on rights 
discourse and judicial review has become the dominant jurispruden­
tial preoccupation for a large number of Canadian constitutional 
theorists, sometimes ad nauseam. Many attempts have already been­
made to delineate the various positions that might be held. Bakan is 
manichean, splitting the terrain between sceptics and believers; 8 
Weiler identifies pure market libertarians (a nonexistent breed in 
Canada), liberal romantics, radical cynics and pragmatic pluralists/ 
Etherington talks about realists, liberal romantics and liberal prag­
matists; 10 while Herman spotlights debunkers, promoters, reaction-. d . u anes an pragmatists. 
7. "Anglophone Legal Theory", supra note 3. In this section I confine my discus­
sion to Canadian legal academics, therefore ignoring the important parallel debates 
among, for example, Canadian political scientists or, more generally, American legal 
theorists. For a very helpful discussion of Canadian political science in this regard 
see A. Dobrowolsky, "The Charter and Mainstream Political Science: Waves of 
Practical Contestation and Changing Theoretical Currents" in D. Schneiderman & 
K. Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: 1he Impact of the Charter of Rights on 
Law and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 
[forthcoming]. 
8. J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't 
Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian 
Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 445 
[hereinafter Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory]. 
9. P.C. Weiler, "The Charter at Work: Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of 
Labour and Employment Law" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 117. 
10. B. Etherington, "An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws Under the 
Charter: Of Realists, Romantics, and Pragmatists" (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 685. 
11. D. Herman, "The Good, the Bad and the Smugly: Perspectives on the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1994) 14 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 589. 
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As I read the literature there appear to be three broad constituen­
cies: Charter advocates who assume that rights �ike the rule of law) 
are an "unqualified human good" 12 and that judicial review is an 
important check on majoritarian zealotry; Charter critics who 
worry about the undemocratic nature of judicial review and pro­
blematize facile assumptions about the beneficence of a rights 
dominated regime; and progressive deviationists who, while some­
what nervous of both rights and judicial review, seek to make the 
best of an imperfect but potentially negotiable set of constitutional 
discourses and institutions. Each of these perspectives merits further 
discussion. 
The dominant intellectual paradigm in Canadian jurisprudence 
presumes that rights are both natural and unequivocally desirable. 
Drawing on the spectre of an unfettered majoritarianism, advocates 
of an entrenched Charter argue that the more rights we have, the 
better.13 Viewed from this perspective, the juridical history of 
Canada is one of inexorable (if slow) improvement as we moved 
from a shaky common law regime of inchoate rights, to the statu­
tory recognition of rights and then to the constitutional entrench­
ment of rights. 14 Jurists who subscribe to such a perspective envi-
12. The phrase is from E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: 1he Origins of the Black 
Act (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) at 266. 
13. See T.S. Axworthy, "Colliding Visions: The Debate Over the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms" in J. Weiler & R. Elliott, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: 1he 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1980-81 (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 13; 
"Liberalism and Equality" in K. Mahoney & S. Martin, eds., Equality and Judicial 
Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 43; A. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds., Equality 
Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985); 
N. Lyon, "The Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Freedoms Guarantee: 
What To Do With Vague but Meaningful Generalities" (1982) 4 Supreme Court 
LR. 57 [hereinafter "The Teleological Mandate"]; J. MacPherson, "Litigating 
Equality Rights" in L. Smith, ed., Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights 
(Saskatoon: Canadian Human Rights Reporter, 1986) 231 at 232; and J.D. Whyte, 
"Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter" (1983) 
13 Man. L.J. 455. 
14. See D. Baker, "The Changing Norms of Equality in the Supreme Court of 
Canada" (1987) 9 Supreme Court L.R. 497; D. Gibson, 1he Law of the Charter: 
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sion the Charter as a normative and institutional structure designed 
to encourage both the courts and the legislators to maximize human 
rights15 and social justice.16 However, if there is conflict between the 
legislatures and the courts, most rights advocates tend to argue that 
the courts should have the last word, not only because they are 
likely to be the strongest guardians of minority interests, 17 but also 
because the Charter itself provides objective and determinative right 
answers.18 Importantly, many rights theorists emphasize that the 
judicial enforcement of rights is grounded in principle - not policy, 
1. . 19 Th all . f . d . .  al " h. "20 d po 1t1cs or power. e c 1s or JU 1c1 statesmans 1p an 
"constitutional fidelity. "21 
Others, however, are uni�pressed and advance several arguments 
against the ideology and practice of 'Charterization'. First, critics 
argue that judicial review is undemocratic because judges are 
Equality Rights (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) c. 1; W. Tarnopolsky, "The Evolution of 
Judicial Attitudes" in Mahoney & Martin, ibid. at 378; and LE. Weinrib, "The 
Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter" (1988) 10 Supreme Court 
LR. 469 [hereinafter "Section One"]. 
15. W.R. Lederman, "The Power of the Judges and the New Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms" (Charter Edition) (1982) U.B.C. L Rev. 1; "Democratic 
Parliaments, Independent Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" 
(1985) 11 Queen's LJ. 1; P.J. Monahan & M. Finkelstein, "The Charter of Rights 
and Public Policy in Canada" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ. 501 at 507; B. Slattery, "A 
Theory of the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 701; and LE. Weinrib, 
"Learning to Live With the Override" (1990) 35 McGill LJ. 541 [hereinafter 
"Override"]. 
16. N. Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall 
LJ. 95 [hereinafter "Constitutional Interpretation"]. 
17. Slattery, supra note 15; and Whyte, supra note 13. 
18. D. Beatty & S. Kennett, "Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest and 
Political Participation in Free and Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 
573. 
19. M. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry" 
(1982) 4 Supreme Court LR. 131; "The Teleological Mandate", supra note· 13 at 245, 
252; and "Section One", supra note 14 at 481-482 and 508-513. 
20. D. Gibson, "Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 
Some General Considerations" in W. Tarnopolsky & G. Beaudoin, eds., 1he 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 25 at 28. 
21. "Constitutional Interpretation", supra note 16 at 99. 
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unelected and therefore unacr0 1 !11table.22 Moreover, judges are said 
to be unreflective of th<" L:c:tss, race, gender, (dis)abilities, sexual ori­
entations or poJ;ticaJ. preferences of the larger Canadian society.23 
Particular :1aention has been focused on the hostility of the courts 
t<' rights claim? by unions as manifested in: Dolphin Delivery24 
where it was held that there is no right to secondary picketing; the 
Labour T rilogy25 where it was held that freedom of association does 
not include the right to strike; and the B. C.G.E. U.26 case in which 
the right to picket, though recognized as a form of expression under 
s. 2(6), could be justifiably restricted under s. 1.27 Inversely, the 
courts are identified as having a pro-business tendency in, for 
example, their somewhat formalistic and legalistic recognition of 
corp9rations as persons and the correlative entitlement to the 
panoply of Charter rights.28 
Second, and closely related, is the argument that a public preoccu­
pation with Charter and rights arguments tends to subordinate and 
colonize other forms of political debate and mobilization. Such a 
dynamic prioritizes litigation rather than participation29 and recon-
22. Bakan, supra note 8; W. Bogart, Courts and Country (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) c. 1; J .  Fudge, "Labour, The New Constitution and Old 
Style Liberalism" (1988) 13  Queen's L.J. 61 at 64, 68-69 [hereinafter "Old Style 
Liberalism"]; and M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in 
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Thompson, 1994) at c. 2, 43. 
23. Bakan, supra note 8. 
21. R. WD.S. U. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986) 2 S.C.R 573. 
25. Reference re: Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 313; P.S.A.C. 
v. Canada, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 424; and R. WD.S. U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 460. 
26. B. C. G.E. U. v. British Columbia (,4 ttomey-Genera O, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. 
27. Etherington, supra note 10; M. MacNeil, "Courts and Liberal Ideology: An 
Analysis of the Application of the Charter to Some Labour Law Issues" (1989) 34 
McGill L.J. 86. 
28. A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 Supreme Court LR. 473 at 490-
493; E.A. Sheehy, "Regulating Crimes and the Charter: R. v. Wholesale Travel Inc." 
(1992) 3:2 J. Human Just. 111; and C. Tollefson, "Corporate Constitutional Rights 
and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 309 . 
29. Bogart, supra note 22 at c. 1; J. Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of 
Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" 
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structs citizens as 'petitioners'.30 This situation is compounded by 
the danger that litigational politics tends to catapult lawyers into the 
position of a political vanguard; a vanguard that is disconnected 
from broader social causes.31 
Third, Charter politics are accused of being elitist in that only the 
institutionally well positioned or the affluent can afford to utilize 
h 32 h L . 33 . .d h h . t e courts - t e avzgne case 1s sa1 to ave cost t e umons 
about $400,00034 and rumour has it that the Women's Legal 
Education and Action Fund (LEAF) may have spent up to $1 mil­
lion on Andrews.35 
Fourth, it is argued that in both form and structure the Charter 
advances individualism, consolidates essential capitalist legal rela­
tions and undercuts solidarity and collectivism in that it favours 
freedom of the individual from state intervention when a caring 
society requires such state intervention to equalize and redistribute 
social goods.36 Chief Ju�tice Dickson's (as he then was) liberal indi­
vidualistic prognostications on the purpose of the Charter in Hunter 
(1989) 1 7  Int'lJ. Soc. L. 445 [hereinafter "Sexual Violence"]; andJ. Webber, "Tales of 
the Unexpected: Intended and Unintended Consequences of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms" (1993) 5 Canterbury L. Rev. 207 at 221-225. 
30. Mandel, supra note 22 at xi-xii. 
31. W. Conklin, "The End of Judicial Review" (1992) 10 Current Theory 1; 
S. Razack, Canadian Feminism and . the Law: The Women's Legal Education and 
Action Fund and the Pursuit of Equality (Toronto: Second Story Press, 1991) at 52-58. 
32. G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step 
Forward or Two Steps Back (Ottawa: CACSW, 1989). 
33. Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 2 1 1. 
34. I. Greene, The Charter of Rights (Toronto: J ames Lorimer, 1989) at 62-63. 
35. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter 
Andrews]. 
36. L. Apland & C. Axworthy, "Collective and Individual Rights in Canada: A 
Perspective on Democratically Controlled Organizations" (1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 44; Bogart, supra note 22 at 125; Brodsky & Day, supra note 32; R.C. 
Way, "The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible Politics of Fault" (1992) 12 
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 128; J. Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social 
Transformation?" (1990) 5 Can. J. Law. & Soc. 47  at 57 [hereinafter "Social 
Transformation"]; A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden 
Agenda" (1987) 45:6 Advocate 857; and Webber, supra note 29  at 218-221. 
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v. Southam,37 Big M Drug Mart38 and Oakes39 are often targeted 
h 40 ere. 
Fifth, it is argued that the courts are an inappropriate forum for 
social policy making because: a) judges are ill-equipped to deal with 
large-scale social issues; b) the exceptionalism and specificity of indi­
vidual cases unduly decontextualizes the complexity of the issues;41 
and c) when legalized, all public social problems tend to he re-en­
coded and repackaged as issues of private individual rights which 
can only generate zero-sum solutions.42 Again, labour relations are 
frequently cited. 
Finally, due to their abstraction, rights discourse and legal reaso­
ning are identified as deeply indeterminate and therefore capable of 
diverse interpretations depending on the ideological preferences of 
the judges and the contexts in which such interpretations are in­
voked.43 Moreover, there is the problem of causal indeterminacy. 
That is, the long term and broader social impact of a particular deci­
sion or set of decisions is extremely difficult to predict.44 In short, 
the symbolism of a 'rights victory' may not have any concrete so-
. 1 . 45 eta impact. 
37. Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc. , [1984) 2 $.C.R. 145. 
38. R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M]. 
3 9. R. v. Oakes, [1986) 1 $.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes]. 
40. Mandel, supra note 22; and Petter, supra note 28 at 493-498. 
4 1. J. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits 
to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Strnggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 485 at 548 [hereinafter "Public/Private Distinction"]; and Greene, supra 
note 34 at 62-69, 222. 
42. Mandel, supra note 22 at 171; Petter, supra note 28 at 478; and Webber, supra 
note 29 at 225-227. 
43. "Public/Private Distinction", supra note 41 at 532-533; Petter, supra note 28 at 
486; and Webber, supra note 29 at 227-229. 
44. Bogart, supra note 22 at c. 2, 5; "Public/Private Distinction", supra note 41 at 
536; and H.J. Glasbeek, "A No-Frills Look at the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: or 
How Politicians and Lawyers Hide Reality" (1 989) 9 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 293 
at 349-351. 
45 . J. Bakan·'& D. Pinard, "Getting to the Bottom of Meech Lake: A Discussion of 
Some Recent Writings on the 1987 Constitutional Accord" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. 
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Dichotomies rarely capture the full panorama of perspectives.46 
Thus it can be suggested that distinct from the faithful and the skep­
tics there may be a third categ�ry of jurists who, very roughly, might be described as the 'progressive deviationists'.47 They are 
united in a couple of beliefs. First, deviationists accept that, for bet­
ter or worse, judicial review is a constitutional fact and that it is 
therefore essential to focus on what can best be done with this re­
configuration of social institutions. Second, they argue that rights 
have no inherent or essential meaning. Rather, they are social con­
structs that have been imagined and given concrete form at certain 
historical conjunctures. Consequently, they are capable of being 
remade in the contemporary historical moment. Third, given this 
plasticity, rights can be reconceptualized, reinterpreted and rearticu­
lated not solely as exclusive fences to protect the individual, but also 
as relational and communitarian interests that entitle citizens to 
pursue social goods. Fourth, deviationists argue that such an open­
ended vision of rights can allow for significant differential t�eatment 
and an expansive pluralist tolerance in constructing social, legal and 
constitutional policies. Fifth, this pursuit of difference can be most 
effectively achieved if citizens and judges conceive of rights claims as 
part of an ongoing mutually empathetic social conversation. Sixth, 
at the level of strategy, deviationists argue: a) negative rights are ex­
tremely valuable for those who are still the victims of discrimina­
tion; b) rights generally can serve as a medium of personal valoriza­
tion; c) rights discourse can operate as a potent form of 
(counterhegemonic) consciousness-raising, resistance and mobiliza­
tion and, therefore, it cannot be abandoned as a potential political 
platform; and d) the achievement of a rights claim can send an im­
portant symbolic message to the broader society. 
Rev. 247 at 260; J. Fudge & H. Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics with 
Little Class" (1992) 1 Soc. & L. Stud. 45 at 56-59; and A. Petter, "Legitimizing Sexual 
Inequality: Three Early Charter Cases" (1989) 34 McGill L.J .  358. 
46. B. Cossman, "'Dancing in the Dark': A Review of Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh 
Day's Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps 
Back?" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 223. 
47. R. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1986) at 1 5-22, 88-90. 
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Herman, Nedelsky and Trakman are probably the most explicit 
spokespersons for this perspective 48 but I would suggest that it also 
informs the legal philosophy of many feminists,49 self-described 
egalitarian liberals50 and some post-liberals.51 
In their previous works both Beatty and Hutchinson have aligned 
themselves with, and been primary spokespersons for, two of these 
48. D. Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); J.  Nedelsky, "Reconceiving 
Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities" in A. Hutchinson & L. Green, 
eds., Law and Community: The End of Individualism? (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 
2 19; J .  Nedelsky, "Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self" (1990) 30 Representations 
162; J .  Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship" (1993) 1 Rev. Con. Stud. 1; 
and LE. Trakman, Reasoning With the Charter (Toronto: Butterworths, 1 992). 
There are of course differences, most notably Herman's socialist feminism renders 
her less optimistic than N edelsky and T rakman. It is to be noted however that 
Trakman's optimism seems to have faded as 1 995 wore on. See e.g. LE. Trakman, 
"The Demise of Positive Liberty?" (1995) 6 Con. Forum 71; and LE. Trakman, 
"Section 15: Equality? Where?" (1995) 6 Con. Forum 1 12. 
49. See e.g. Brodsky & Day, supra note 32; M. Eberts et al., The Case for Women's 
Equality: The Federation of Women Teachers Association and the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: FWTAO, 1991) c. 7; D. Greschner, "Judicial Ap­
proaches to Equality and Critical Legal Studies" in Mahoney & Martin, supra note 
13 at 59; M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare 
Claims" (1 993) 1 9  Queen's L J .  65; H. Lessard, "Relationship, Particularity, and 
Change: Reflections on R. v. Morgentaler and Feminist Approaches to Liberty" 
(1991) 36 McGill LJ. 263; Razack, supra note 3 1; and C. Sheppard, "Caring in Hu­
man Relations and Legal Approaches to Equality" (1993) 2 N.J.C.L 305. 
50. See e.g. D. Dyzenhaus, "The New Positivists" (1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 361; D. 
Dyzenhaus, "Regulating Free Speech" (1991) 23 Ottawa L Rev. 289. See also 
B. Slattery, "Rights, Communities and Tradition" (1991) 41 U.T.LJ. 447. 
5 1. See e.g. A. Bartholomew & A. Hunt, "What's Wrong with Rights?" (1990) 9 
Law & Inequality l ;  P. Mackiem, "First Nations Self Government and the Borders 
of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 382; R. Moon, "The Scope 
of Freedom of Expression" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 331; R. Moon, 
"Discrimination and its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights Under the 
Charter" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall LJ. 673; R. Moon, "Access to Public and Private 
Property under Freedom of Expression" (1988) 20 Ottawa L Rev. 339; and 
R. Moon, "Lifestyle Advertising and Classical Freedom of Expression Doctrine" 
(1991 ) 36 McGill LJ. 76. 
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positions: Beatty as a fervent advocate for both a Charter and judi­
cial review and Hutchinson as an unapologetic critic of both. 
Despite these differences there are, as we shall see, certain common­
alities: first, they both· accept that the words of a constitutional text 
are deeply indeterminate; and second, they are both very �ritical of 
the record of the Supreme Court of Canada. Where they differ is in 
their interpretation of the significance of these analyses. Beatty' s 
project is an exercise in redemption and salvation. Hutchinson's is 
an exercise in reconsideration and re-orientation. My sympathies 
tend to lie with Hutchinson, though I have reservations about both. 
II. Beatty's Grand Theory 
A. The Thesis Described 
Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice52 is simultaneously a 
rearticulation, refinement and expansion of an argument that David 
Beatty has been working on for at least 10 years. Stated at its most 
ambitious, his project is to provide an account of the possibility, 
intelligibility, objectivity and integrity of law;53 to develop a theory 
that allows us to distinguish law from politics; and finally to con­
struct a mechanism that will enable us to subordinate politics to 
law.54 For Beatty, constitutional law - and in particular a regime of 
judicially enforceable rights - is the primary vehicle through which 
modern society can achieve these not insubstantial feats. 
More specifically, Beatty's aim is to provide a justificatory account 
of what he calls "constitutional supremacy", the idea that a constitu­
tion (a.k.a. "the mother of all laws")55 can provide determinative 
parameters for social organization that are uncontaminated by the 
contingencies of politics. 56 This, of course, immediately runs into 
52. Theory and Practice, supra note 4. 
53. Ibid. at xi. 
54. Ibid. at 9, 156. 
55. Ibid. at 5. 
56. Ibid. at Chapter 5. 
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the difficult problem that not all constitutions share the same sub­
stantive vision, organizational structure or discursive form. But 
Beatty has an answer to this, one that appears to be more proce­
dural than substantive. His argument is that all constitutions have 
. h ( " .  1 · "57 h "· an m erent purpose an mner og1c, per aps even an mner mo-
rality"58): they function not so much to recognize or allocate rights 
as they do to constrain the leviathanic potential of public power. 59 
This is where judicial review enters the scene. Obviously a consti­
tution is not self-activating, it needs someone or something to oper­
ate on its behalf. Moreover, constitutions are usually, though not 
always, written in highly abstract language60 that needs to be ren­
dered concrete enough to generate results in specific situations. For 
Beatty this is the function of judges: to be the "guardians of the con­
stitution."61 But the manifest problem is the familiar question of, 
who is to guard the guardians? It is Beatty's reply to this that forms 
the core of his argument: the constitution itself gives rise to 62 two 
principles of justification that predetermine not only the scope of 
executive, legislative and administrative power,63 but also judicial 
power. In other words, judicial review is legitimate to the extent 
that it "dispassionately, impartially" and "faithfully"64 conforms 
with what Beatty calls the proportionality and rationality princi­
ples. 
These principles relate to both ends and means. The proportiona­
lity principle (which he also describes as the consistency, anti-dis­
crimination or equality principle) engages in a type of cost-benefit 
analysis by inquiring whether the public interest justifies the pro-
57. Ibid. at 24. 
58. Ibid. at 157. 
59. Ibid. at 17, 62, 151. 
60. Ibid. at 7. 
61. Ibid. at 95. 
62. Ibid. at 96. 
63. Ibid. at 15. 
64. Ibid. at 104. 
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posed limitation on an individual or group. 65 In short, proportiona­
lity asks if the ends are justified. The rationality principle (whicli he 
also calls the necessity principle) focuses on means. It inquires 
whether there are other less invasive policies or instruments avai­
lable. If so, then state action can be invalidated by the courts. For 
Beatty, perfection appears to entail _ minimal state intervention.66 
Thus he argues that these are not simply interpretive principles, but 
rather standards that impose a significant justificatory burden upon 
h d · 67 t e state an 1ts agents. 
Beatty spends a great deal of effort addressing the attributes of 
these principles. They appear to have two sets of qualities: 
sufficient specificity and adequate determinacy to constrain judi­
cial discretion;68 and, at the same time, a generality that renders 
them universally valid and attractive. First, he is emphatic that 
these two principles enable him to: 
resurrect and defend the integrity of law, . . .  [to] reveal an overarching, unified 
method of constitutional review that does distinguish, in an objective and principled 
way, between laws that are constitutional and those that are not.69 
Thus, he has no doubt that they are capable of guiding, bin­
ding70 and even controlling71 judges, and that this justifies his 
proposition that judicial review is compatible with democracy.72 
Second, he · claims that the proportionality and rationality princi­
ples constitute "general standards of justice."73 More ambitiously, 
he proclaims that: 
. . . few students take issue with the idea that Canadian constitutional law is . . .  
about how two basic principles of rationality and proponionality have provided the 
65. Ibid. at 15-16. 
66. Ibid. at 1 1 1 .  
67. Ibid. at 17, 105. 
68. Ibid. at 144. 
69. Ibid. at 15.  
70. Ibid. at 9. 
71. Ibid. at 156. 
72. Ibid. at 152. 
73. Ibid. at 104. 
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Court with the same framewc: � vI analysis from beginning to end. Nor do they 
dispute the claim that rl:c�!.: principles give expression to timeless ideals of equality, 
justice, and persor. ... l autonomy. The rationality requirement, which obliges all those 
entr1sred witi1 the legal powers of the state to use the most moderate means possible 
to pursue their political goals, maximizes the freedom of individuals and smaller 
communities to control their own destinies. And the ends-oriented principle of 
proportionality, or consistency guarantees a measure of equality of treatment by 
insisting that whatever restrictions are imposed on personal autonomy, or the sover­
eignty of one or other order of government, must be roughly equal to the kinds of 
constraints others have been made to endure.74 
Moreover, Canada appears to be too provincial for the ambitions 
of this theory. Beatty's aim is even grander still: to argue that "the 
basic principles of constitutional law are essentially the same around 
the world,"75 to confirm that "principles of rationality and propor­
tionality are universal in space as well as in time. "76 
The book then is designed to prove the accuracy of these proposi­
tions on both an empirical and a normative level. Empirically, in 
Chapter Two Beatty reviews Canadian division of powers constitu­
tional provisions and doctrine to identify patterns of judicial reason­
ing that can be re-envisioned as somewhat inchoate, but certainly 
identifiable, articulations of the proportionality and rationality 
principles. Particular attention is focused on the mutual modifica­
tion rule.77 In Chapter Three he argues that the Charter also reflects 
these principles and that the Supreme Court recognized them in its 
landmark decision of Oakes.78 More ambitiously still, in Chapter 
Four, Beatty embarks on a tour of the constitutions and doctrine of 
a variety of jurisdictions to uncover the transcultural pervasiveness 
of the constitutional principles. In American jurisprudence he 
analyses the strict scrutiny doctrine;79 in India it is the constitutional 
74. Ibid. at 103-104. 
75. Ibid. at 10. 
76. Ibid. at 104. 
77. Ibid. at 27-30. 
78. Oakes, supra note 39. 
79. Iheory and Practice, supra note 4 at 109. 
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discourse of arbitrariness, reasonableness and fairness;8° in Japan it is 
the criteria of strict reasonableness and necessity;8 1 in the European 
Court of Human Rights it is necessity82 and a European standard;83 
and finally, in Germany it is the Rechtsstaat principle84 through 
which the "Court has shown its willingness to intervene in almost 
every aspect of community life and to invalidate any law that is ar­
bitrary, excessive, or imbalanced."85 For Beatty, this "comparative 
jurisprudence . . . gives law and these legal principles a measure of 
objectivity and neutrality that transcends national borders and clif-
f 1 d · ,,86 erent cu tures an environments. 
To be clear, Beatty does not argue that in all these areas of study 
every judicial decision has descriptively engaged in, or relied upon, a 
mode of analysis that incorporates the principles of rationality and 
proportionality. Indeed, to the contrary, he is candid that in a large 
number, even in the majority of the cases he has reviewed, these 
principles have not been adopted. In this regard he has developed 
his normative argument: it is precisely because the principles were 
not applied that these decisions are constitutionally incorrect inso­
far as they have been contaminated by non-constitutional 
variables. 87 Thus, in the context of Canadian federalism, he is 
highly critical of the provincial orientation of Lord Haldane and the 
centralism of Bora Laskin.88 Similarly, he argues that although the 
Supreme Court got it right in Oakes,89 from about 1985 to the pres­
ent, judges have been insufficiently aggressive in promoting these 
principles through the Charter. Finally, in his comparative study he 
80. Ibid. at 1 14. 
8 1 .  Ibid. at 122. 
82. Ibid. at 134. 
83. Ibid. at 136. 
84. Ibid. at 128. 
85. Ibid. at 13 1 .  This is not Beatty's first attraction to German modes of social in­
teraction. In Putting the Charter to Work (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1987) he was most impressed with the German system of labour relations as 
discussed at 147-155. 
86. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 105. 
87. Ibid. at 126. 
88. Ibid. at 60. 
89. Oakes, supra note 39. 
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is highly critical of the deference many courts demonstrate to the 
political regimes in their own jurisdictions. His point is that the 
principles of proportionality and rationality could indeed provide 
the appropriate framework of constitutional analysis, if only the 
judges had the wisdom to use them90 and to use them as Beatty 
proposes. 
Although Beatty is discouraged by his empirical findings, he re­
fuses to counsel despair. In his last chapter, he reasserts the potential 
of his principles to maximize human autonomy and he encourages 
human rights activists to continue the struggle in the courts to force 
the judiciary to be faithful to the supremacy of the constitution. 
Specifically, he suggests that only lawyers who manifest a commit­
ment to the principles of rationality and proportionality should be 
appointed to the bench.91  In sum, for Beatty, the constitution is willing, it is only the spirit of the judges that is we�. 
B. The Thesis Criticized 
Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice is an engaging and pro­
vocative justification for a regime of judicially enforceable rights . In its ambition to develop a constitutional super-theory, the book 
makes bold arguments that merit careful consideration by anyone 
who worries about the relationship between law, politics and jus­
tice. Despite its virtues, the book is marred by several methodologi­cal and substantive problems. 
90. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 17. 
91 . Ibid. at 60. 
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(i) Methodological Problems 
Let me begin with two stylistic concerns. Beatty tells us that his 
primary audience is students who are approaching constitutional 
law for the first time. Throughout the book he adopts the habit of 
1 . . h "[ ] d . . kl "92 " f c aiming t at m ost stu ents see quite qmc y . . . , most o 
d h "93 "f d ak . my stu ents come to see t at . . .  , ew stu ents t e issue 
with . . .  "94 some aspect of his analysis. I have two problems here. 
First, this is an example of lectern empiricism. Beatty' s reliance 
upon such a strategy does nothing to advance his core thesis and 
distracts the reader by invoking the pseudo-legitimizing authority 
of hypothetical students. Second, and more problematically, the 
reader must wonder about those students who do not agree, or who 
take issue with Beatty's adamantly correct interpretation of 
constitutional law - what is their constitutional law fate? In short, 
there is a tone of the oracular in the book with the implication that 
if the student/ reader doesn't understand and agree, then they have 
missed their constitutional salvation. 
Furthermore, Beatty's quest for the holy grail of apolitical deci­
sion-making entails journeys into fairly fantastic domains. For ex­
ample, as he embarks on his comparative voyage, he asserts that the 
'd al f " al . . . d al "95 · 1 96 1 e s o equ 1ty, Justice an , person autonomy are time ess 
and that his two principles of rationality and proportionality are 
"universal in space as well as in time."97 In their best light, such 
claims can only be seen as unguarded hyperbole; in their worst 
light, they represent ahistorical ethnocentrism. Even the most su­
perficial familiarity with the history of intellectual thought indicates 
that conceptions of justice and equality shift with time, place and 
culture. 
92. Ibid. at 152. 
93. Ibid. at 13 .  
94. Ibid. at 103. 
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid. 
97. Ibid. at 104. 
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Beyond these stylistic ,:, ,:-icerns there may also be more serious 
problems of meth JC. for example, in his second chapter Beatty 
addresses C'ai 1adian federalism and the division of powers. This 
chapter is pervaded by a sense of doctrinal presentism in that prior 
to the 1980s there was a bias towards either centralism or provin­
cialism, but in the last 15 years the Supreme Court has struck the 
appropriate balance. For Beatty, this is a happy conjuncture because 
contemporary doctrine fits with his principles and reinforces co­
operative federalism at the same time. The problem here is that 
Beatty fails to interrogate the virtues and possible limitations of co­
operative federalism and, more importantly, its generative forces. 
Co-operative federalism as a political configuration may or may not be appropriate for late twentieth century Canada, but the point is 
that it is a contingent constitutional configuration determined by a 
host of social, political and economic forces. Could it not be argued 
that given a different alignment of determinants, an alternative 
constitutional regime from that of Beatty's principles might well be 
desirable?98 However, this sort of reflection is beyond the scope of 
Beatty's analysis because his exclusive focus is on constitutional 
documents and judicial decisions. He pays little attention to the 
formative contexts that circumscribe constitutional discourse. Con­
sequently, Beatty's attacks on misconceived provincialism and cen­
tralism may be too hasty for he pays insufficient attention to the 
broader terrain in which constitutional modelling takes place. 
These concerns about the somewhat ahistorical and decontextual 
weaknesses of his method of analysis are intensified by the fourth 
chapter: the comparative study. As we have seen, Beatty makes 
large claims in this regard: that the principles of proportionality and 
rationality transcend time and space. But the only proof he invokes 
is a review of six constitutions and the dicta of several supre_me 
courts. There is a significant body of comparative scholarship 
98.  For a similar analysis of the importance of contingency in Canadian federalism 
practice and doctrine see B. Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm 
in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" 
(1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308. 
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which vehemently argues that the mere comparison of constitu­
tional or legal texts will provide little genuine insight into other 
legal cultures.99 Therefore, it may be argued that Beatty's method of 
comparative scholarship is extremely elementary. Even if we were 
to overlook this problem, Beatty admits that while traces of his 
principles are to be found in the various constitutional regimes 
which he analyzes, their influence is small. 100 However, he makes 
no serious attempt to understand why this might be so. Perhaps it is 
because his principles do not carry as much constitutional reso­
nance for those who operate in a different jurisprudential psyche 
and milieu. Rather than investigating such a possibility - a possibility that would threaten to undermine the universality and 
objectivity so crucial to his project - Beatty accuses the 'infidels' of . ·b·l· 101 b. 102 d bd. . f d 103 irrespons1 1 ity, 1as an a 1cat1on o uty. 
Another methodological problem is that Beatty fails to address 
contradictions between what he is saying in different parts of the 
book. On occasion, he states that due to the inevitable indetermi­
nacy of constitutional documents, the text really does not matter 
that much because behind and beyond the constitutional phrases 
there is always and already the inner logic of his two principles. 104 
Indeed, he is critical of the detail of India's constitution because it 
can interfere with the discovery of the real principles. 105 At other 
99. See e.g. A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed. 
{Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993); and J. Hill, "Comparative Law, Law 
Reform and Legal Theory" (1989) 9 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 101. I would like to thank 
Prof. T. Scassa for bringing these sources to my attention. This problem is avoided 
in some, but not all, of the essays in Beatty's edited collection, Human Rights and 
Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994). 
100. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 109. 
10 1 .  Ibid. at 145. 
102. Ibid. at 126. 
103. Ibid. at 1 10. 
104. Ibid. at 38-39. 
105. Ibid. at 121 ,  143. Indeed, I get the impression that Beatty would be most happy 
with a constitution that had only two sections: 
100 
1. The Constitution is supreme. 
2. All government acts must accord with the justificatory principles of 
proportionality and rationality. 
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points, however, Beatty puts a great deal of emphasis on constitu­
tional texts. For example, he is extremely critical of recent Supreme Court decisions that have limited the scope of the Charter, arguing 
that there is nothing in the text to support such an interpretive 
strategy . 106 Statements such as these reveal an assumption that con­stitutional supremacy requires textual fidelity. But if the text does 
not really matter, as he suggests elsewhere, how is this possible? 
Beatty's· solution to this problem not only compounds the con­
tradiction, it suggests yet another methodological problem: anthro­
pomorphism. In order to advance his proposition that all constitu­
tions are designed to regiment excessive state power, he proclaims 
h . . d d107 d . ios . d d I t at constitutions eman an mstruct JU ges to a opt a arge, 
liberal and purposive approach. However, Beatty provides no spe­
cific reference to a particular section in support of this claim. Nor could he because it is not the constitution which is the actor here. A 
constitution is just a collection of words and conventions. A consti­
tution does not demand or instruct - it is interpreted. A constitu­
tion has no agency - it is a terrain of discursive struggle. Like it or 
not, in a constitutional regime that adopts the practice of judicial 
review, constitutional supremacy will inevitably lapse into judicial 
supremacy because, as Beatty himself admits, texts are indetermi­
nate and judges are the guardians.109 A large, liberal and purposive 
interpretive ideology, like the principles of rationality and propor­
tionality, is not pregnant within a constitution. It is a gloss which 
flesh and blood people like Beatty attempt to ascribe to a text. 
Anthropomorphism in the service of a covert ideological position is 
a strategy of avoidance, not persuasion. 
A cognate problem is Beatty's employment of definitional essen­
tialism whereby he avoids substantive engagement through the pre­
tence that a concept or practice has one, and only one, meaning and 
that this meaning is inherent in the concept. An example of this 
106. Ibid. at 87, 91 , 95. 
1 07. Ibid. at 88. 
108. Ibid. at 89. 
1 09. Ibid. at 95. 
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occurs in Beatty's discussion of Andrews. 1 10 In the course of his 
criticism of the Supreme Court's focus on historically disadvantaged 
groups, he asserts that the judges demonstrate "a deeply. flawed un­
derstanding of what equality really means."111 He then proceeds to 
set them straight by rearticulating a version of the 'similarly situ­
ated' test. I will come back to a substantive discussion of his conc�p­
tion of equality later, but my point here is that equality does not 
really mean anything. It is one of those essentially contested con­
cepts112 that have been advanced, rethought and reconfigured in 
different politico-juridical contexts. Equality, in other words, is a 
prism through which people struggle to articulate a particular social 
vision and as such is hospitable to a plurality of constructions, each 
of which is infused with certain background assumptions. Beatty is 
certainly entitled to argue for the virtues of a similarly situated con­
ception of equality, but that is very different from criticizing the 
Court for getting it wrong on the basis of some putative inherent 
meaning. 
Finally, there is the methodological problem of slippage. It is ob­
vious that Beatty puts great store in his two principles. However, a 
close reading of the text suggests that his conception of their pedi­
gre·e is highly variable. On occasion, he seems to suggest that they 
are merely "formal, abstract rules of logic and practical reason­
ing." 113 On other occasions, he su,ggests that they have much greater 
normative weight as "general standards of justice" 1 14 and "universal 
duties."115 For example, he appears to believe that, if properly ap­
plied, his principles might enable a court to identify a "list of policy 
1 10. Andrews, supra note 35. 
1 1 1 .  Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 93. A similar strategy is involved when he 
proposes that American judges, despite the lack of textual support in the 
Constitution, have recognized that affirmative action is "inherent in the concept of 
equality." Ibid. at 143. 
1 12. See W. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts" (1956) 77 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 167, for a discussion of the phenomenon of competing defini­
tions for important societal concepts such as "work of art" or "democracy". 
1 13. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 101.  See also Beatty's discussion of the 
inherently subjective application of these abstract principles by the judiciary at 146. 
114. Ibid. at 104. 
1 1 5. Ibid. at 142. 
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objectives . . . that are beyond the constitutional competence of any 
lawmaker or administrator to translate into law." 116 At still other 
points in his argument, he struggles to articulate some intermediate 
posltlon, claiming that their pedigree 1s essentially 
'methodological'1 17 in that they allow: 
. . . the legislative and executive branches virtually unfettered discretion in the social 
objectives· that they may pursue . . .  (so long as) no one's freedom to live life as he or 
she sees fit will be interfered with gratuitously or in a way that is out of proportion 
with how others with similar interests have been treated.118  
Once again, Beatty could have taken greater care in specifying more 
precisely what his principles are designed to achieve. 
But a prior question is: what is it about proportionality and ra­
tionality that constitutes them as principles? Beatty's repeated em­
phasis on their principled nature is designed to render them neutral 
and apolitical and therefore distinct from policy preferences, arbi­
trariness or subjective value. However, Beatty never discusses the 
relevant criteria that might be used to determine if something quali­
fies as a principle. I believe Beatty's interpretation of the empirical evidence when he argues that it is possible to identify concepts and 
criteria in constitutional doctrine, both at home and abroad, that 
dovetail to some extent with what he calls rationality and propor­
tionality. But empirical echoes doth not a principle make. It seems 
to me that rationality and proportionality, and their cognate terms, 
are simply two of the choices available within rhetorical discourse 
that can be invoked in the 'thrust and parry' of constitutional en­
gagement. If such a characterization is feasible, then the pedigree of 
Beatty' s so-called principles is in no way distinct from doctrines 
such as deference, political questions, etc. which Beatty portrays as 
policy arguments. 119 To simply characterize something as a princi-
1 1 6 .  Ibid. at 1 1 0. 
117. Ibid. at 152. 
118. Ibid. at 1 6 0. 
1 19. Ibid. at 124-125. 
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ple will not do. The argument why it qualifies as a principle is mis­
smg. 
Or, to come at the same problem from a slightly different angle 
by adopting the discourse of Beatty himself, could it not be argued 
that the inner logic of Canada's constitutional order demands a 
strong separation of powers and that constitutional fidelity requires 
that the courts be relatively deferential on principle? Thus, judicial 
deference rather than being irresponsible, 120 biased121 and an abdica­
tion122 of the proper constitutional dictate may be quite principled, 
depending upon one's underlying constitutional vision. 
In short, without some attempt to be more methodologically ro­
bust in his understanding of what constitutes a principle, Beatty's 
quest for neutral principles seems unattainable. 
(ii) Substantive Concerns 
Beyond some of the foregoing methodological infelicities, 
Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice also raises several substan­
tive concerns. In particular, I am worried about Beatty's assump­
tions regarding the nature of the state, equality, personhood and 
group identity. 
First, in the context of the Charter, it is not clear on what basis 
Beatty is able to imbue dicta in Oakes123 with a talismanic aura. This 
case is made to do a great deal of work in Beatty' s thesis: first, it is 
said to articulate relatively uncontestable social values; secondly, the 
values that are proposed in the case are said to operate as constraints 
upon judicial discretion. 
To elaborate, Beatty focuses on the dicta in Oakes which suggest 
that the purpose of the Charter is to promote: 
120. Ibid. at 145. 
121 .  Ibid. at 126. 
122. Ibid. at 1 10. 
123. Oakes, supra note 39. 
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. . .  respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commit,:;,-. .  � :o social 
justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beli.:[�, 1espect for cultural 
and group identity, and faith in social and politic;,1 >:.icutions which enhance the 
participation of individuals and groups in soc;ety. 12' 
While I might agrer with Beatty that in the abstract these appear 
to be desirab1-::! .:.ocial values, they are neither uncontroversial, nor 
totct!. For example, some First Nations peoples have articulated a 
different vision of social relations, one that emphasizes the social 
virtues of trust, kindness, sharing and strength.125 And when Beatty 
argues that these broad social values have a strong guiding influence 
on judicial discretion, 126 I think that he underestimates the indeter­
minacy argument - an argument which, as we have seen, he relies 
upon elsewhere in the book. For example, what does the 'inherent 
dignity of the human person' mean? Conceivably it could mean 
everything from freedom from torture to a right to social welfare, 
though in the last few pages of his book Beatty excludes the lat­
ter.127 Or again, what constitutes a person? Are fetuses and corpora­
tions included? Beatty's position on these; as we shall see, is hardly 
beyond debate. Similarly, 'social justice' and 'equality' are open to a 
plethora of interpretations as are conceptions of 'social and political 
institutions which enhance participation'. 
Perhaps there is no better example of the plasticity of these pur­
poses than the suggestion that Canada respects "cultural and group 
identity."128 This purpose is particularly important in that group 
identification seems to fit rather uncomfortably with Beatty's pri­
mary premise that constitutions are driven by an ambition to 
restrain the state so as to maximize individual autonomy. Indeed 
1 24. Ibid. at 1 36. 
1 25. See e.g. M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpre­
tive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" in Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory, 
supra note 8 at 5·1 7. See generally P. Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk 
Woman Speaks {Halifax: Fernwood, 1 995) .  
1 26. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 65-66. 
1 27. Ibid. at 158-159. 
128. Oakes, supra note 39 at 1 36. 
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throughout the book, Beatty tends to play down the importance of 
collective rights. They usually only appear in parentheses or as an 
afterthought. 129 Nowhere does Beatty explicitly address the possibi­
lity that sometimes individual autonomy may conflict with 
"cultural and group identity" which, he states, are both primary 
Charter purposes. 13° For example, consider the Quebec Protestant 
School Board case131 where aspects of the language provisions of 
Quebec's Bill 101 132 were invalidated. Beatty discusses the case as an 
example of the Supreme Court striking down legislation on the ba­
sis that its ends are not justified under the proportionality principle. 
Uncharacteristically, he is not particularly critical of this decision.133 
Beatty seems to assume that langua·ge rights are individual rights and 
that the Supreme Court legitimately invalidated this law in order to 
protect the rights of anglophone individuals who sought education 
in their own language. However, language can also be conceived of 
as a group right134 essential to the preservation of cultural identity 
which is, according to Oakes, 135 an important Charter purpose. 
Beatty fails to address the possibility that these are incompatible 
constitutional visions that require substantive choices be made by 
those who judge. In short, I would suggest that the purposes identi­
fied in Oakes do little to effectively constrain judicial opportunities. 
Indeed, an argument could be made that such dicta expand rather 
h h d . f . d . 136 t an contract t e omam o m etermmacy. 
A second substantive concern relates to Beatty's implicit onto­
logy. Beatty is adamant that his two principles are neutral and ob-
129. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 1 5, 96, 101 ,  1 04, 1 60-1 6 1 .  
130. Ibid. at 62, 6 6 .  
1 3  l .  A.G. (Quebec) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [ 1984] 2 S.C.R. 6 6 .  
132. Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. 1 977, c. C-1 1 .  
133. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 72. 
134. See e.g. M. Bastarache et al., Language Rights in Canada (Cowansville: Yvon 
Blais, 1 987) 3-67 and C. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in A. Gutman, ed., 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1 994) 25  [hereinafter "Politics of Recognition"]. 
135. Oakes, supra note 39. 
13 6 .  See generally R.F. Devlin, "Ventriloquism and the Verbal Icon: A Comment 
on Professor Hogg's 'The Charter and American Theories of Interpretation"' (1988) 
26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 .  
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jective. But it seems to me that he overstatPS l , i$ case. Beatty's claim 
is that the purpose of the constirnt>,;-i is to put restrictions on state 
power in order to maxim:zc human· freedom. 137 Thus, as we have 
seen, he . is highly r::; t:1cal of Japanese judges for their deference to 
h bl. . . 1 d b . 138 t e pu 1c m; e� est as art1cu ate y representative government. 
Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that they are biased, irresponsible 
and unprincipled. But respect for the public interest may be pre­
mised on a different set of assumptions about personhood and self 
than those which underlie Beatty' s work. In other words, the dif­
ference between Beatty and some of those whom he criticizes is not 
that his position is principled and theirs is not, but that his is 
premised upon an individualistic ontology which envisions the self 
as prior to the community whereas others may see the self as 
. d b h . 139 Th . . . d constitute y t e commumty. us, a const1tut1on premise 
upon a communitarian ontology may not have as its inherent 
purpose the shackling of state power, but rather the facilitation of 
. certain communal norms which can best be attained through a pat­tern of judicial deference to the representative will. 
Beatty's problem in this regard is that he has built into his consti­
tutional vision an ontological premise that is not just substantively 
loaded but that is also unargued for. It is this assumption that 
underpins his apparent belief that the promotion of hate literature, 
pornography and even killing are prima facie protected rights under 
s. 2(6).140 Despite his suggestion that the focus of his theory is not 
on individual rights, but the obligations and duties of the state, his 
starting point remains the classical liberal shibboleth of individual 
liberty. Again, my point is not so much to dispute the attractiveness 
137. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 95. 
138 .  Ibid. at 126-127. 
139. See generally "Politics of Recognition", supra note 134. 
140. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 90. He does acknowledge that they may be 
limited by the proportionality and rationality principles as filtered through s. 1 .  
However, he provides little discussion of these contentious issues or, for example, 
the harm principle which is itself flexible in its meaning and contestable in its scope. 
Charter, supra note 1 .  
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and merit of such a vision, but rather to simply highlight that this is 
not a value-neutral ontological assumption. 
However, on other occasions he appears to abandon, or at least 
radically modify, his priorization of the individual and his assertion 
that his principles are universal. Consider for example the following 
discussion: 
Everyone is agreed on what principles control the outcome of the case and what the 
content of those rules are. The divergences occur because of different perceptions 
that judges may take of the relevant factual (evidentiary) material and the legal and 
cultural background against which the principles are applied. The importance of tran­
quillity and civility in Japanese society, or of foetal life in the Irish Republic, for 
example, may justify laws restricting street demonstrations and door-to-door can­
vassing in Japan and abortions in Ireland, even though they might be struck down in 
other societies, such as Canada and Denmark, where these interests and activities have 
been valued quite diflerently .141 
Who does the valuing in a society such as the Republic of Ireland? 
Also, whose values get counted in Beatty's constitutional calculus? 
The answer I would suggest is the Catholic moral majority which, 
historically, has shown little respect for women's equality rights. In 
effect Beatty, in a concrete application of his principles, seems to 
abandon Irish women to Ireland's cultural background at the very 
moment when one would have thought that his principles might 
have done some good work. 142 
The foregoing concerns about Beatty's (selective) commitment to 
an individualistic ontology also raise questions about his conception 
of both the state and equality. The overall structure and tone of the 
book suggests that he sees the state in a basically negative light. Its 
agents are always latently threatening. But it may be that in certain 
forms and practices, state agents are potentially empowering; that 
their primary role is to enhance equality rather than infringe li­
berty. More generally, could it not be argued that the 'inner 
morality' of the Canadian Constitution is to promote equality 
rather than liberty? Such an interpretation has been advanced by 
141 .  Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 145 [ emphasis added]. 
142. Ibid. at 101. 
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many Canadian femi!:;st� and seems to have been of interest to the 
J P  Supreme Court. . J  
Beatty appears to disagree. Consider, for example, some of the 
cases he seems to applaud. In the American context he appears to 
endorse cases such as Lochner v. New York, 144 Buckley v. Valeo145 and Regents of University of California v. Bakke146 as they demon­
strate the courts in their most bullish 147 moments, striking down 
redistributive policies "that are beyond the constitutional compe-
f 1 k d . . 1 . 1 "148 tence o any awma er or a mm1strator to trans ate mto aw. 
Similarly, he appears to be delighted with the fact that German 
courts have struck down legislation regarding, for example, rent 
control and consumer protection 149 thereby enhancing the rights of 
property owners and commercial enterprises against tenants and 
consumers. 
In sharp contrast to his apparent antipathy for the state and public 
power, Beatty appears to have an excessively benign opinion of pri­
vate power, particularly that of corporations. He seems undisturbed 
by the fact that in cases like Big M Drug Mart150 corporations bene­
fitted from freedom of religion arguments. 151 He is also highly criti­
cal of judicial deference to legislative regulation in both Edwards 
B k 1 s2 d I . rr 1s3 b h 
· · 
h · oo s an rwm 1 oy ecause t ey are excessive m t e1r re-
143. For a discussion of this argument see "Anglophone Legal Theory", supra note 
3. 
144. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
145. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
146. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
147. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 1 10. 
148. Ibid. at 1 10. Beatty's position on the American Supreme Court is somewhat 
ambiguous. While it is clear that he is opposed to judicial deference, ibid. at 1 10.1 1 1 ,  
i t  is not clear whether he prefers strict scrutiny, ibid. at 109-110, or the "middle 
ground" of intermediate scrutiny, ibid. at 1 1 1-1 12. 
149. Ibid. at 131 .  
150. Big M, supra note 39. 
1 5 1 .  Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 68. 
152. R. v. Edwards Books andArt, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713. 
153. Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 
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straint of corporate autonomy.154 Moreover, he seems to favour 
b . . al . f .al . t55 d ro ust constitution protection or commerc1 expression an 
d . f f . h t56 even a vocates m avour o corporate access to s. 7 ng ts. 
To me this s�ggests a rather unbalanced and even decontextual 
understanding of the relations of power and inequality in Canadian 
society. Threats to the integrity and autonomy of the individual are 
undoubtedly very real in Canadian society. But they are not neces­
sarily only traceable to public state power. Private power, though 
perhaps less 'in your face' is just as threatening - indeed, private 
power may be considered more threatening by reason of its invisi­
bility. But Beatty's theory implies that state power is prima facie 
malignant whereas corporate power is presumptively benign. N ei­
ther position is warranted. Power, both public and private, is 
politically ambiguous. Judgments about its exercise need to be made 
in context, free from the ideological imbalance built into a 
public/private dichotomy. Moreover, power is relational. As such, 
power is channelled and circumscribed by a host of material, insti­
tutional and ideological forces. Consequently, state power can inter­
sect and dovetail with private power in a multiplicity· of ways, 
sometimes reinforcing it, sometimes challenging it. In short, be­
cause he relies upon an insufficiently complex conception of power, 
Beatty' s constitutional vision is premised on a rather conventional 
(perhaps Hobbesian) understanding of social and political arrange­
ments that is, once again, neither neutral nor even empowering for 
human autonomy. 
Currently, there exists a fairly rich philosophical literature that 
suggests two traditions within liberalism: classical liberalism and 
egalitarian liberalism.157 The former priorize liberty and understand 
equality as either formal equality or equality of opportunity. The 
latter priorize equality and allow for significant restraints on liberty 
in the pursuit of enhanced substantive social equality. The forego­
ing discussion suggests that Beatty subscribes to the classical liberal 
154. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 83. 
155. Ibid. at 1 1 1-112.-
156. Ibid. at 79. See supra note 1 at s. 7. 
157. See e.g. Dyzenhaus, supra note 50. 
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view. This is confirmed when we analyze how Beatty conceives of group claims and, in particular, his thoughts on the position of 
women and aboriginal people in the constitutional order. 
As mentioned, Beatty puts great store in the Oakes158 case. Despite 
the fact that the Supreme Court explicitly targetted group identity 
in its catalogue of Charter purposes, group rights are usually men-
. d 1 . . . B ' k 159 A I h . d uone on y m passmg m eatty s wor . s ave pomte out, 
Beatty does not really adequately address the possibility that there 
may be conflict between individual and group rights. This claim is 
reinforced when we analyze women's rights in Beatty's scheme of 
things. In general, it can be said that women do not feature promi­
nently in Beatty's discussion. Usually they are only mentioned in 
· 160 o · h d d . . 11 passmg. n occasion t ey are even ren ere const1tut10na y 
invisible. For example, in discussing prostitution, Beatty's primary 
concern seems to be with defending the province's interest in regu­
lating the quality of life in its neighbourhoods and on its streets.161 
Furthermore, the concern that women's equality rights are subor­
dinate to the liberty principle is implied by the fact that Beatty 
seems pleased that the Supreme Court struck down the rape shield 
. . . s b 162 d 1 ff 1 . CT 163 In prov1s1ons m ea oyer an sexua o ences aws m ness. con-
158. Oakes, supra at note 39. 
159. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 15, 96, 101, 104, 160-161.  
160. Ibid. at 65, 1 12, 131 .  Some readers may think it a little unfair to criticize an 
author for failing to discuss a particular issue, in this case the group rights of women 
and aboriginal peoples. In reply I would simply suggest two points. First, Beatty's 
failure to seriously discuss group rights is an internal flaw because it indicates that 
his is a selective reading of the Oakes case. Second, the constitutional status of 
women and First Nations peoples are two of the most pressing concerns for con­
temporary Canadian constitutional law and potentially two of the most challenging 
areas for Beatty's thesis. It is curious that a theory as ambitious as his would shy 
away from such obvious concerns. 
161 .  Ibid. at 56. 
162. R. v. Seabcryer, [1991] 2 $.C.R. 577. 
163. R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 $.C.R. 906. See Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 75. 
These cases are a particularly good example of how constitutional norms can be at 
odds and the only way to resolve the contradiction is to make a choice, a choice that 
is not neutral but unavoidably ideological. 
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trast, he appears to be somewhat critical of the Butler164 decision 
because the court showed too much deference to the legislature. 165 
Finally, there is Beatty's position on abortion. As we have seen, 
Beatty appears to believe that the prohibition on abortion in Ireland 
is constitutionally justified. However, he seems to support the 
A,( / 166 d . . h b . h " . d morgenta er ec1s1on on t e as1s t at women game more con-
trol over their bodies." 167 This, however, echoes the liberty and 
privacy understanding of access to abortion - a viewpoint which 
egalitarian feminists argue is of only limited utility to many women 
because it does not impose an obligation on the state to provide 
abortion facilities on the basis of equal access to health care.168 Even 
in this regard, there is ambiguity in Beatty's position because, later 
in the book, he is uncharacteristically descriptive of the German 
Constitutional Court's 1975. abortion decision where the court took 
positive steps to criminalize abortion on the basis of a right to life 
169 argument. 
Aboriginal groups and their rights seem to be even more marginal 
in Beatty's constitutional vision. On occasion, there is a ·passing 
reference to discrimination under the Indian Act170 and even an ex­
tremely ambiguous reference to small communities controlling 
. their own destinies. 171 However, in the main, First Nations peoples 
are ignored by Beatty. Consider again Beatty's conception of the 
federal principle: it ensures that "sovereign power is divided in 
Canada between two 'equal and co-ordinate' orders of government" 
the effect of which is to "prevent either level from being subordi­
nated and dominated by the other."172 The problem here is that 
164. R. v. Butler, [1992) 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter Butler]. 
165. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 83-84. 
166. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988) 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler]. 
167. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 101. 
168. See e.g. Lessard, supra note 49. 
169. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 132-133. It is worth noting that although 
Beatty acknowledges in a footnote a 1993 decision there is no substantive discussion 
of this later abortion case which modifies the earlier decision in quite significant 
ways. Judgment of May 28th 1993, BVerfG, 88 BVerfGE 203. 
170. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5. 
171. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 100. 
172. Ibid. at 26. See also page 61. 
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Beatty's constitutional analysis starts in 1867 and therefore ignores 
crucial constitutional concerns that predate this moment. Thus, 
there is no reference to the prerogative treaties or the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763173 which are constitutional documents that 
many First Nations peoples and even members of the Supreme 
Court believe to be of vital importance.174 Moreover, these docu­
ments raise crucial questions about the rights of peoples175 which 
appear to fit quite uncomfortably within Beatty's constitutional 
order, grand though it may be. 
In sum, one of the most remarkable things about Constitutional 
Law in Theory and Practice is the certitude with which Beatty ad­
vances his core argument: that the principles of proportionality and 
rationality can provide neutral and universal parameters for consti­
tutional decision-making that are sufficiently determinative to cur­
tail judicial megalomania. The optimism manifests itself in a multi­
tude of ways: in the suggestion that the constitutional text means 
very little; in the argument that although the Supreme Court of 
Canada has been "erratic and inconsistent" 176 in recognizing and 
adopting his principles in the federalism context, "over time the · b h . b" 177 . h b 1· f h d . courts are . . .  gettmg etter at t e JO ; m t e e 1e , t at esp1te 
the fact that in the Charter context the courts' approach has been 
· · 178 d h I . f h . h ummpress1ve an t e resu tant protection o uman ng ts 
" b' b "179 h h Id ·11 b 1· d 180 . am 1guous at est, t e courts s ou stl e re 1e upon; m 
the proposition that, in spite of themselves, courts everywhere sub­
scribe to the two principles; and in the conception of reform which 
173. 1he Royal Proclamation, 1763 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 1. 
174. See e.g. Henderson, supra note 6. 
175. M. Asch & P. Macklem, "Aboriginal Peoples and Canadian Sovereignty: An 
Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991) 29 Alea. LR. 498, and P. Macklem, "Distributing 
Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples" (1993) 45 Stanford L. Rev. 
1311. 
176. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 50. 
177. Ibid. at 54. 
1 78. Ibid. at 74-84, 106. 
179. Ibid. at 106. 
180. Ibid. at 99. 
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suggests that all that is required is a personnel change. 181 Beatty's 
optimism leads him to conclude that "fortunately . . .  both the in­
tegrity of law and the efficacy of the courts are still within our · 1 " 182 B h . h' d h f£ power to contro . ut w o 1s t 1s we an ow are we to e ec-
tively control a wilful judiciary? Given the record of the courts, as 
it has been presented to us by Beatty, why should we have confi­
dence? In short, Beatty' s argument is a call for faith 183 in the possi­
bility of perfectionism. But if I refuse to take the leap it is not be­
cause my choice is wrong in some constitutional sense, it is because 
to my agnostic mind, history is a better predictor of the future than 
prophetic pronouncements. 
III. Hutchinson's Groundless Theory 
A. The Argument Described 
If Beatty's conception of constitutional law and judicial review is 
strikingly jejune, Hutchinson's is decidedly jaundiced. As the subti­
tle of Waiting for Cora/84 makes clear, it is an exercise in critique 
rather than refurbishment. While Beatty believes in universal prin­
ciples which can lay a solid foundation for autonomous legal 
decision-making, Hutchinson's commitment is to antifound­
ationalism. This is the epistemological proposition that there is no 
prepolitical or transcendental location from which we can claim 
legitimacy based on neutrality.185 His argument is that because there 
are no independent grounds for legal or political decision-making, 
we need to seek legitimacy for our practices and institutional 
arrangements in a new and hitherto unexplored way. 
Constitutional law, in his view, is driven by certain historically spe-
181 .  Ibid. at 59. 
182. Ibid. at 57. 
183. See also J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legiti­
macy in Canadian Constitutional Thought" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 123. 
184. Cora/, supra note 5. 
185. Ibid. at 121, 158. 
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cific ideological preferences 186 and judicial review is an illegitimate 
exercise of power because structurally anJ discursively it is elitist 
and unaccountable. 187 Demo -racy rather than liberty 1s 
Hutchinson's 'lode star' . 
Hutchinson bre�k:. his analysis into three parts. Chapter One out­
lines some. i.::tirly large claims. Chapters Two to Five constitute a 
crit.ique of contemporary Canadian constitutional law and legal 
theory. And Chapters Six to Eight tentatively map out an alterna­
tive path which decentres both law and judicial review in favour of 
an invigorated democratic politics. 
Hutchinson structures his argument as an allegory to Samuel 
Beckett's existentialist classic, Waiting For Godot, 188 in which 
Vladimir and Estragon wait endlessly and pointlessly for the ever 
absent Godot. Hutchinson argues that most Canadian lawyers and 
jurists await the coming of CORAF (The Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms) in the same way, believing that eventually liberal legalism 
will guarantee social justice. However, this is a false hope, a tragic 
farce, 189 because liberal legalism has underlying assumptions and 
commitments which make it constitutively incapable of facilitating 
the social transformations that are required to achieve a more just 
society. Specifically, Hutchinson proposes that the Charter, as 
liberal legalism's 'crowning jewel\ is an especially nefarious barrier 
to the pursuit of social justice for several reasons: 
• it priorizes individual liberty at the expense of the social good; • it fetishes the rhetoric of rights at the expense of a discourse of ·responsibility; • it is dependent upon the invocation of a public/private 
dichotomy that insulates private power while undermining the 
possibilities of progressive public power; 
186. Ibid. at 24. 
187. Ibid. at 22. 
188. S. Beckett, Waiting/or Godot (New York: Chelsea House, 1 987). 
189. Cora/, supra note 5 at 228. 
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• institutionally, it confers far too much power on an unrepre­
sentative and unaccountable elite whose identity, training and 
experiences render them unsuited to the pursuit of substantive 
social equality; and • rights discourse is deeply indeterminate and therefore incapable 
of bearing the w:eight that Charter advocates would impose 
upon 1t. 
In order to terminate this farce and bring u·s back to reality,190 
H h. l . d 191 utc mson attempts to construct an a ternative postmo ern 
d Th. l h. . . 192 d .b rama. 1s p ay, t 1s poetic exercise, oes not ascn e to 
Canadians the role of mere spectators. 193 Rather, it brings us all 
onto the enlarged stage of a reconstructed state and gives us the op­
portunity to script our own lines and lives as authors and 
empowered citizens: it is a radical participatory democracy prem­
ised upon and committed to a dialogic ethos. In turn, this generates 
an expansive conception of a constitution as something larger than, 
and quite distinct from, historical documents and formal institu­
tions: 
A constitution is an organic process through which states determine the kind of 
society and citizens that they are and can become. It embraces the dynamic efforts of 
people to negotiate and establish the institutional and substantive terms of their 
collective existence . . .  It is not a one-time event or a purely practical act of political 
will. It is an enduring moment and continuing occasion through which societies, 
sometimes as much by default as design, constitute themselves and define the tempo­
rary circumstances and transitory possibilities of their existence. While the formal 
documents and conventions of nationhood represent a privileged resolution of con­
stitutional debate, each attempt to interpret and reinterpret that compromise gives 
fresh meaning and effect to it. At the same time, the efforts of workers and the poor 
to achieve better social programs and a fairer distribution of wealth should also be 
counted as constitutional expressions. Thus constitutionalism embraces the practical 
and the utopian, the institutional and the ideological, the real and the imagined, the 
past and the future. It is the heart of politics . . .  194 
190. Ibid. at 25. 
191. Ibid. at 26 .  
1 92 .  Ibid. at 228-229. 
193. Ibid. at xiii. 
194. Ibid. at 23. 
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In sum, fr-:- �Iutchinson, the fact that we find ourselves without 
detenr.;nate foundational truths should not be a cause for panic or 
despair. To the contrary, groundlessness can free us from the myth 
of necessitarianism - the conflation of the actual with the inevita­
ble. By clearing this space, antifoundationalism can provide us not 
just with the opportunity, but also with the responsibility to pursue . d a1· . .al d 19s _a more JUSt an eg 1tanan soc1 or er. 
In Chapter Two, Hutchinson develops his central deconstructive 
move: the argument that rights talk is indeterminate. The reason 
why this is crucial is obvious from the preceding discussion of 
Beatty. Conventional wisdom, "Corafianism" in Hutchinson's 
terms, 196 is premised upon two assumptions: a) the belief that rights 
concretize transhistorical principles that are substantively neutral 
with regard to citizens' conceptions of the good, because their 
function is simply to ensure that each person's autonomy is un­
touched so long as it does not harm another; and b) that in mo­
ments of contestation rights are specific enough to provide judges 
with determinative correct answers that inhibit them from impos­
ing their own politicized conception of the good. Hutchinson 
launches a five-pronged argument to demonstrate that these as­
sumptions are indefensible. He claims: 
There is no neutral standpoint from which to identify who are to be the recipients 
of such rights . . .  
There is no non-political way of arriving at what particular group of rights are to be 
recognized and enforced . . .  
There is no uncontroversial means of determining the scope and nature of each par· 
ticular right . . .  
There is no method internal to the theory of rights that can be used to adjudicate 
upon the clash of competing rights . . .  
The recognition that rights are fundamental, but not absolute, gives rise to the diffi­
culty of balancing the public interest against the individuals' claims. 197 
1 95. Ibid. at 164. 
196. Ibid. at 22. 
1 97. Ibid. at 29. 
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In Chapter Three, Hutchinson moves from his deconstruction of 
Charter doctrine and rights discourse to a critique of Beatty and 
Conklin. In his opinion, these scholars seek to defend that which he 
has demonstrated to be indefensible. His basic thesis is that these 
"Corafians" subscribe to a formalism that attempts to repress rather 
than acknowledge that it is ideology which inevitably drives all 
forms of decision-making including judicial review. 198 Objectivity is 
impossible199 because interpretation is contingent on the "identities 
and interests of the interpreters"200 and so the Rule of Law is 
inescapably and undemocratically the rule of lawyers.201 Rationali­
zation rather than reason is the hallmark of law talk. 
Although Hutchinson believes that rights discourse is indetermi­
nate and cannot be salvaged for the tasks of liberal legalism, he is 
quick to point out that indeterminacy should not be confused with 
normative neutrality. Thus in Chapters Four and Five, via discus­
sions of poverty, abortion and liberalism's conception of the state, 
he identifies three particularly significant problems with rights dis­
course: a) its proclivity for individualism; b) its tendency for ab­
straction; and c) its reliance upon an incoherent public/private 
dichotomy. Hutchinson claims that the re-encoding of public social 
problems as a question of private legal rights means that the speci­
ficities of unequal power relations are ignored and the possibility of 
structural reorganization is presumptively excluded.202 The result is 
that rather than being empowered by rights discourse, women and 
poor people are marginalized and even rendered juridically invisi­
ble. Hutchinson suggests that a better, post-liberal approach to the 
problems of abortion and poverty would focus more on social 
needs and communal solidarity; reconceive the nature of the con­
temporary state; and strive to enhance the space for choices that are 
genuine rather than structurally coerced.203 In particular, the com-
198. Ibid. at 85 . 
. 199. Ibid. at 86. 
200. Ibid. at 60. 
201. Ibid. at 74. 
202. Ibid. at 95, 101. 
203. Ibid. at 108. 
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mitment to "autonomy, participation, and substantive equality"204 
will require the corralling of corporate and patriarchal power. 
Hutchinson claims such changes are not likely to be triggered by 
the judiciary for they are within the thrall of the classic liberal as­
sumptions. The only hope is active democratic participation.205 In his sixth chapter, before moving to a substantive discussion of 
his revised constitutional system, Hutchinson addresses the argu­
ments of Langille, Nedelsky and Trakman. They appear to go part way with him, but cannot bring themselves to abandon either 
rights talk or the practice of judicial review. Once again the charge is formalism,206 though dressed up in some form of jurisprudential 
attire: pragmatism, relationalism or socialism. However, for 
Hutchinson all these arguments fail to pay sufficient attention to his 
core credo: judicial empowerment is the antithesis not the apotheo­
sis of an unmodified civic democracy.207 As practitioners and en­
forcers of a "falsely privileged mode of discourse,"208 judges are part 
of the problem, not part of the solution.209 The final two-and-a-half chapters are given over to a tentative 
mapping of Hutchinson's own preferred constitutional vision, ele­
ments of which have been foreshadowed by his critique. His recon­
structive project proposes, at a minimum, a two pronged strategy: 
working within law and working without law. 
While Hutchinson is highly critical of law, he is not cynical about 
it.210 His is a position of progressive, responsible and strategic 
. . 211  d " . df 1 d . "212 h' h . scepticism an mm u mo erauon, one w 1c recognizes 
that law is not going to fade away, but at the same time, one that 
204. Ibid. at 153. 
205. Ibid. at 153. 
206. Ibid. at 155, 168. 
207. Ibid. at 168, 173. 
208. Ibid. at 171. 
209. Ibid. at 1 68. 
210. Ibid. at 173. 
211. Ibid. at 158, 173, 175. 
212. Ibid. at 177. 
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wants to see law's imperialistic ambitions curtailed. More precisely 
still, he suggests that law, like the state, is multifaceted and can take 
various forms some of which are more in line with his democratic 
project,213 and some of which are anathema to it. For example, re­
vitalized juries and local justice commissions would support his 
project while judicial review would undermine it. Indeed, he real­
izes that in Canada the constitutional die of judicial review has been 
d h " . al . d "214 b b . d . cast an t at occasion strategic a vantage may e o tame via 
litigational politics. He illustrates this program of postmodern pro­
gressive lawyering through a discussion of R. v. Morgentaler. 215 However, Hutchinson is at pains to emphasize that litigational poli­
tics on the basis of rights should only be relied upon in the most 
dire circumstances for even success can result in deradicalization 
through partial incorporation. He therefore proposes that legal 
talents could be put to better use, for example, in the pursuit of 
legislative reform and enhanced democratic processes.216 What is to 
be avoided is the reaction of lawyers who automatically assume that 
going to court is the only available strategy. Such a reaction rein­
forces the vicious cycle in which needs are translated into rights that 
can only be determined by judges who are not only unaccountable 
but insensitive to the discourse of needs and substantive equality.217 
So, according to Hutchinson, the primary struggle for progres­
sives is to shrink the sphere of influence of law, rights discourse and 
an illegitimate judiciary218  and fill that void with the "untried possi­bilities of dialogic democracy."219 His "general theory of democratic 
dialogism"220 is a sophisticated argument that is difficult to con­
dense. Basically, Hutchinson argues that political discourse carries a 
greater presumption of legitimacy than legal discourse because it is 
213 .  Ibid. at 1 72 . 
. 214. Ibid. at 174. 
215. Morgentaler, supra note 167. 
2 1 6 .  Cora/, supra note 5 at 182. 
217. Ibid. at 108. 
218. Ibid. at 1 53. 
2 19. Ibid. at 185. 
220. Ibid. at 189. 
1 20 22 Queen's Law Journal 
· based upon democracy.221 Participatory democracy is preferable to 
representative democracy because it is more immediate in its 
responsiveness to the citizenry. Participatory democracy is best 
conceived of as a dialogue between members of the community. 
Note, however, that for Hutchinson language is not simply a me­
dium, it is always and already a political process that incorporates 
some important solidaristic norms.222 Dialogue, by its nature, is less 
individualistic and libertarian than rights discourse because it is 
premised upon intersubjectivity.223 By this Hutchinson means that 
the parties to a conversation are in a relationship of "shared com-
. d 1 d d' "224 • h . f h . m1tments an mutua un erstan mgs m t e pursuit o t eir on-
going negotiations.225 This implies an ethos of solidarity,226 
1. 127 ·b·l · 22s . d h . 219 D · d. equa 1ty,- respons1 1 tty, canng an s anng. - emocratic 1a-
logue is structurally less hierarchical and potentially more inclusive 
than law talk because it is not premised upon the idioms of an elitist 
caste. Furthermore, Hutchinson suggests that the more citizens par­
ticipate in democratic discourse, the more they will feel 
empowered.230 In turn, this sense of empowerment reinforces our 
capacity to rethink the nature of the state: not simply as a set of 
homogeneous governmental institutions . but "as a site and structure 
for the creation of the exercise of power"231 that cannot be captured 
by some putative public/private dichotomy. 
To develop these claims a little more concretely, Hutchinson re­
visits and recasts the debate around free speech and, in particular, 
focuses on the dangers of constitutionally entrenching the right of 
221. Ibid. at 74-75. 
222. Ibid. at 191. 
223. Ibid. at 204. 
224. Ibid. at 197. 
225. Ibid. at 227. 
226. Ibid. at 189. 
227. Ibid. at 212. 
228. Ibid. at 216. 
229. Ibid. at 188. 
230. Ibid. at 216. 
231. Ibid. at 208. 
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commercial speech. The argument appears to be that in Canada the 
greatest threat to human autonomy and social equality at the end of 
the twentieth century comes from corporate power not state 
power: we tend to priorize our identity as consumers over our 
identity as citizens.232 According to Hutchinson, an empowered 
democratic polity would take citizenship seriously and would there­
fore allow for significant legislative and administrative restrictions 
on corporate expression because it tends to silence other forms of 
speech. In other words, dialogic democracy focuses less on the right 
. d h " .  . d. . ,,233 h to expression an more on t e mteracttve con 1t1ons t at can 
make engaged and egalitarian conversation possible.234 Indeed, posi­
tive steps could be taken to create discursive space for those who, 
historically, have been silenced.235 Constitutionally entrenched and 
judicially enforced rights can only serve as a bulwark against such 
democratic goals and should therefore be discarded.236 
Hutchinson concludes the book by calling on us to quit the farce 
of CORAF. He admits there are no guarantees that we will end up 
in a better situatfon. However, he assures us that an empowered 
democracy rather than judicial supremacy is the "least worst match 
with the non-foundationalist project. "237 In that way, citizens in all 
their diversity would at least be able to participate in constructing 
their future rather than, like Estragon and Vladimir, · being para­
lyzed waiting for a salvation that will never come. 
B. 1be Argument Criticized 
The reader will probably sense that in terms of philosophical dis­
position, political commitment and jurisprudential affiliation my 
position is much closer to Hutchinson than to Beatty. However, 
232. Ibid. at 199. 
233. Ibid. at 204. 
234. Ibid. at 206. 
235. Ibid. at 213. 
236. Ibid. at 201-202. 
237. Ibid. at 228. 
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Hutchinson's proJect 1s also vitiated by several problems, some 
. . quite senous. 
(i) Stylistic and Methodological Problems 
On occasion Hutchinson's tendency to lapse into excessive rhetoric 
can cause him problems both minor and substantive. In relation to 
the former, he portrays the debate over the Charter and judicial 
review as a struggle of epic proportions with a comparison to the 
dispute between "Galileo and the Italian establishment."238 More 
seriously, Hutchinson's self-confessed "apostolic"239 zeal can lead 
him to overstate his case. Consider the claims that "rights talk has 
h d . d "240 h " . h alk fl d . "241 d h h a its ay, t at ng ts t atters to ece1ve an t at e 
favours "the virtues of democratic dialogue over the vices of rights 
talk."242 The problem here is that this may be a false dichot�my, 
forcing upon us an either/ or position243 that is neither attractive 
nor politically feasible. Feminist engagements with rights discourse 
is enlightening in this regard. For example, in the course of an ar­
gument that rights talk has "proved sorely inadequate to the task of 
ensuring that women are able to take control of their own 
238. Ibid. at 20. 
239. Ibid. 
240. Ibid. at xi. 
241. Ibid. 
242. Ibid. at xii. 
243. Consider, for example, the following: 
Where rights-talk is abstract, democratic conversation is engaged; where rights­
talk is individualistic, democratic conversation is civic; where rights-talk is le­
galistic, democratic conversation is popular; where rights-talk is myopic, 
democratic conversation is visionary; where rights-talk is anemic, democratic 
conversation is full-blooded; where rights-talk is absolute, democratic conversa­
tion is contingent; where rights-talk is exclusionary, democratic conversation is 
inclusionary; where rights-talk is narrow, democratic conversation is expansive; 
and where rights-talk is blunt, democratic conversation is nuanced. See ibid. at 
216-217. 
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bodies . . .  ", Hutchinson acknowledges that its "achievements . . .  
have been considerable for women in many areas of social 
life . . . "244 But there is no attempt to seriously examine why this 
might be so, or more particularly, how much damage this signifi­
cant exception might do to his larger argument. 
Moreover, as we have seen, he concedes that in a rights-dominated 
regime it may be necessary to invoke the discourse of rights on the 
b . h " . 1 . d "245 . h b h. d as1s t at an occas1ona strategic a vantage m1g t e ac 1eve 
as, for example, in the Morgentaler situation. The problems here are: 
a lack of specificity in mapping out the possibilities for such moves 
and the danger of post hoc rationalization. Hutchinson says very 
little to indicate when it might be appropriate to consider such in­
terventions. The likelihood is that such strategic moves will be cau­
tiously affirmed when they are 'successful' from a democratic per­
spective, but ridiculed if not. But this is unhelpful for those who, 
when faced with immediate and threatening problems such as por­
nography or hate literature, have to decide whether to go the rights 
route or not. 246 ' 
Indeed, at other points Hutchinson seems to buy into rights dis­
course even more directly by proposing, for example, that the 
"regulative ideal of dialogue incorporates both a right to hear, to be 
heard, and to be answered. "247 In V.:..hat way does such a "dialogic 
entitlement"248 really escape the dangers of rights discourse? As pre­
sented, this seems to be something more than 'an occasional strate­
gic advantage', suggesting some sort of essential juridical presupposi­
tion that emanates from his dialogic thesis. Unfortunately, 
Hutchinson fails to address this apparent contradiction. Thus it 
244. Ibid. at 103 . See A. Dobrowolsky, "The Politics of Pragmatism: Women, 
Strategic Representation and Constitutionalism in Canada" (Ph.D. Thesis, Carleton 
University, 1996). 
245. Cora/, supra note 5 at xiii. 
246. Moreover, as one of the anonymous reviewers of this article pointed out, it is 
curious that Hutchinson in a book published in 1995 which focuses in large part on 
dialogues and expressions, has so little to say about cases such as R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 
3 S.C.R. 697; Butler, supra note 165; and R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731. 
247. Coral, supra note 5 at 212 [emphasis added]. 
248. Ibid. at 213. 
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seems that perhaps greater attention needs to be focused on the dif­
ferent forms rights might take, for example; legislative versus con­
stitutional, legal versus moral and civic versus juridical. The more 
nuanced point is that not all rights arguments are inevitably bad; 
rather, it is that they are always dangerous.249 
Finally, there are also several situations when Hutchinson shifts 
from the critical and normative to the empirical without adequately 
considering what this mi'ght entail methodologically. For example, 
Hutchinson claims that in the abortion context "law has tended to 
exacerbate tensions and differences . . .  "250 This is a significant claim 
which depends upon an analysis of the complex relationship be­
tween law, politics, gender and social change that, among other ap­
proaches, might require some comparative study. Unfortunately, 
Hutchinson provides no support for such an assertion. Similarly, 
although he argues that it is desirable for legislatures and administra­
tive agencies to be able to regulate corporate speech,251 he fails to 
consider the problem of agency capture which has been the bane of 
much welfarist social policymaking. Again, in a critique of 
academics who propose a constitutionally protected right to beg, he 
claims that "[t]hese destitute souls beg not for alms, but for an end 
to their plight as hapless hostages to capitalist fortune: it is public 
f . h . h . h h k "252 B trans ormat1on as muc as pnvate c anty t at t ey see . ut 
this proposition is unsupported by any reference to studies that 
might support such a claim and carries a sense that Hutchinson is 
projecting his ideological vision onto their consciousness.253 
249. See P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 1 984) at 343. 
250. Cora/, supra note 5 at 1 02. 
251. Ibid. at 201. 
252. Ibid. at 100. 
253. Moreover, there is the danger that Hutchinson himself does what on the fol­
lowing page he warns against, and what his dialogic theory more generally is de­
signed to prevent: speaking on behalf of the other. Ibid. at 101 .  
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(ii) Substantive Concerns 
Even if Hutchinson were to remedy some of the foregoing stylis­
tic and methodological problems, there remain several substantive 
issues. My concerns in this regard relate mostly to the incomplete­
ness of some of his arguments and thus their lack of persuasiveness. 
One underdeveloped argument relates to Hutchinson's concep­
tion of social and political relations after the collapse of the pub­
lic/ private dichotomy. While he rejects the dichotomy on the basis 
of its tendency to insulate large areas of personal and social interac­
tion from redistributive and regulatory state intervention, he also 
claims that we should not fear its abandonment because such a step 
does not mean that everything will become public and he still sug-
h h ·11 b 1·b al · f " "254 gests t at t ere wt e a post- 1 er conception o autonomy. 
In support he invokes the abortion debate, but the point is not fully 
addressed. One might well agree with the argument that women 
should have control over their bodies and that society requires sig­
nificant restructuring in order to make their options genuinely un­
coerced. But even if these were achievable social goals does this 
mean that the state has no regulative role in relation to a fetus quite 
late in a pregnancy? Hutchinson has little to say in this regard. 
Clearly from the overall argument, he wants it both ways: an ex­
pansive state and an enlarged realm of autonomy. I can agree that 
these should not be assumed to be necessarily antithetical to each 
other, and indeed that frequently they can be mutually supportive, 
but this does not deny the possibility that sometimes the state will 
be a threat to the autonomy of the self. Without the assistance of a 
public/private discourse how are we to make decisions and justify 
our reasons? One is left wondering whether Hutchinson really 
wants to abandon the dichotomy or whether he would simply draw 
the lines somewhat differently. 
I also have concerns about Hutchinson's proposals with regard to 
how we might move from rights talk and social inequality to 
democratic dialogue and social equality. In his quest to divide the 
254. Ibid. at 1 52-153. 
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world between deluded and apologetic "Corafians"255 and critical 
" ,,256 h C kl' " d' . 1,,251 agents provocateurs, e portrays on m as a tra 1t1ona 
scholar and lodges him in the same camp as Beatty, accusing him of 
" . . f 1· "258 "d d b 1· . "259 "d d v1S1onary orma ism, ay ream e 1evmg, ewy-eye 
C f. [. ] ,,260 " al f . ,,261 d " h 11 . ora 1an ism , nocturn antas1es an outrageous a uc1-
. "262 I h bl h natory revenes. ave two pro ems ere. 
First, I think that Hutchinson could have demonstrated a little 
more charity in his interpretation of Conklin's project. There 
could be no suggestion that Conklin is either traditional, formalis­
tic or dreamy, if Hutchinson had read him in the light of his other 
scholarship.263 To my mind their positions are in fact quite close: 
they both want a more accountable judiciary. Where they differ 
relates to their respective assessment of the current politico-juridical 
context and their targeted audiences. Conklin's purpose, as I read 
him, is to encourage judges to be more candid about their images of 
a constitution in order to render their assumptions - social, politi­
cal and ontological - much more transparent thereby making them 
a little more accountabl'e. On this reading, 'image' may be just 
Conklin's way of articulating in a slightly more palatable manner 
(for the judiciary) what Hutchinson calls "ideology."264 While it is 
clear that this is not as radical as Hutchinson's democratic ap­
proach, my point is that the difference is more one of strategic as­
sessment and tactical positioning. Hutchinson may be on solid 
ground if he were to criticize Conklin's strategic sense of trying to 
255. Ibid. at 18. 
256. Ibid. at 20. 
257. Ibid. at 75. 
258. Ibid. at 76. 
259. Ibid. at 78. 
260. Ibid. 
261. Ibid. at 79. 
262. Ibid. at 86. 
263. See e.g. W.E. Conklin, "A Contract" in Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory, 
supra note 8 at 207; W.E. Conklin, "'Access to Justice' as Access to · a Lawyer's 
Language" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 454. 
264. Cora/, supra note 5 at 85. 
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work from within the dominant ideology as being too optimistic. 
However, others could argue with equal merit that Hutchinson is 
too optimistic about the possibilities of empowerment through dia­
logue, or the tactical wisdom of progressives withdrawing from 
constitutional litigation in the expectation that "the judicial process 
might wither away as the leading institutional organ for social 
policy making.''265 This might be naive because non-progressive 
forces are likely to have even greater recourse to judicial review if 
the field is unoccupied. 
Second, in his challenge to Conklin, Hutchinson argues that im­
ages do not drive decision-making, rather it is the "identity and in-
. "266 f h · d B h. . h . f h 1 tentions o t e JU ges. ut t is raises t e question o w at ro e 
ideas play in the world of politics and law. Obviously, Hutchinson 
must believe that they play some role or his own politico-academic 
project would be pointless. Indeed, ohe of the most distinctive 
characteristics of Hutchinson's own style of advocacy is to draw 
very heavily on metaphors to persuade his audience. Moreover, 
within a few pages of trashing Conklin, Hutchinson himself relies 
upon the discourse of 'visions' to advance his own analysis.267 
The concept of identity does a great deal of work in Hutchinson's 
analysis. Time and again he insists that judges are unsalvageable due 
to their identity,268 but is there not a danger of sociological 
essentialism - an excessive reliance on the traditional Marxist apho-. h «· • 1 b . d . . ""'269 wh·l nsm t at socia emg . . . etermmes consc10usness ,: i e my 
own position is far from idealist, in the sense that I think that our 
material and existential contexts undoubtedly circumscribe our 
ways of knowing the world, I also believe that we have the capacity 
for self-reflexivity and that our ideologies can change as we encoun­
ter new contexts and worldviews. This is something which I think 
Hutchinson himself would accept given not only his postmodern 
conception of the self but also his own expressed sympathy for 
265. Ibid. at 182. 
266. Ibid. at 82. 
267. Ibid. at 90-93. 
268. Ibid. at 170-171. 
269. K. Marx, Selected Writings, ed. by D. Mclellan, (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1 985) at 389. 
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those oppressed groups in contemporary Canadian society. How­
ever, it is unclear to me why he singles out judges in particular as 
being especially incapable of 'changing their spots'. i am not sug­
gesting his basic thesis that judges are unlikely agents for progressive 
social change is mistaken. However, what I am pointing out is that 
Hutchinson needs to focus more on the question of the relationship 
between identity and ideology before he dismisses judicial 
consciousness-raising as one potential terrain of contestation. A 
starting point for this might be a discussion of Morgentaler as a 
study of shifting judicial images, visions or ideologies. 
This issue of the relationship between identity, law and politics 
raises another problem for Hutchinson's theory. As we know, 
Hutchinson suggests that progressive lawyering entails the capacity 
on the part of lawyers to curtail their own professional hubris, to 
decentre their own position and take a more modest and deferential 
role in political praxis. However, given that lawyers as a group tend 
to share much of the same identity and ideology as their judicial su­
periors, what causes Hutchinson to have any hope that they are 
more likely to surrender privileged positions for some supporting 
role? Stated more philosophically, what Hutchinson seems to be 
missing is an account of the factors or circumstances that might 
psychologically motivate lawyers (but apparently not judges) to 
embrace the cause of empowered democracy. This is important 
because the same problem also applies to the second prong of his 
reconstructive project - the commitment to the regulative ideal of 
democratic dialogue. What · makes Hutchinson think those who currently have power, and who tend to monopolize the channels of 
communication, would consent to the adoption of dialogic 
processes that so manifestly undercut their own hegemony? 
This problem conveniently leads me to several other concerns 
that I have with his plans for a dialogic democracy. Although 
Hutchinson's dialogic ethos is attractive in that it assumes a basic 
substratum of commonality that makes social, political and legal co­
ordination plausible, further work needs to be done if it is to be a 
credible alternative. Although he is quite critical of the false prom-
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· f " · al· ,,270 d " . l . . l ,,271 . ises o ration ism an umversa pnncip es, it seems to me 
that dialogism is premised upon important rationalistic and cultur­
ally ambitious assumptions. Consider, for example, Hutchinson's 
conception of dialogism as a "regulative ideal."272 His claims are 
large: it "incorporates a right to hear, be heard and to be answered. 
It establishes and maintains· the social conditions for open-ended, 
continuing and meaningful con_versations in which people engage as 
l "273 d h · · . d " 1 d d. equa s an t at it is premise upon mutua un erstan mg, re-
spect, a willingness to listen and to risk one's opinions and preju­
dices, a mutual seeking of the correctness of what was said . . . . "274 
Within such a framework politics is envisioned as the ongoing 
" . [. f] b 1 d 1· "275 negotiat ion o a a ance po ity. 
The assumptions underlying this vision seem to be that our differ­
ences are essentially substantive and with new and improved soli­
daristic procedures it will be possible to move towards substantive 
reform and egalitarian justice.276 However, there are several prob­
lems here. First, and obviously, politics and power are driven as 
much by bad faith as by good faith and this reality cannot be 
glossed over as quickly as · Hutchinson suggests. Seconc:l, even assuming that parties to a politico-juridical dialogue were to operate 
in good faith, there is the question of what language they are to 
communicate in. The assumptions here appear to be twofold: lan­
guage is equally available to all, and language is basically translat­
able. Even if we were to move towards Hutchinson's egalitarian 
"interactive conditions"277 for dialogue, I would suggest that not 
everyone would be able to effectively engage, either quantitatively 
or qualitatively, and thus there is the danger of the "dictatorship of 
270. Cora/, supra note 5 at 22, 206. 
271. Ibid. at 187. 
272. Ibid. at 212. 
273. Ibid. 
27 4. Ibid. at 203-204 quoting R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1983) at 162. 
275. Cora/, supra note 5 at 153. 
276. Ibid. at 169. 
277. Ibid. at 204. 
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the articulate."278 Consequently, I would suggest that his dialogic 
approach, like rights talk, is as he says "always limited and limit­
ing"279, "an impoverished and impoverishing medium of political 
discourse."280 In the same way that rights talk could not guarantee 
women control over their bodies, dialogism contains no guaran-2s1 tees. 
Moreover, I wonder if there is anything in the dialogic model that 
guards against majoritarianism? For example, he argues "[i]t was a 
triumph of popular will that made it possible for the Supreme 
Court to decide as it did i_n Morgentaler."282 Apart from some dubi­
ous echo of a Rousseauean 'general will', my concern here is for 
those who do not share the popular will which, as scholars like 
Beatty have argued, is the very reason for rights in the first place. In 
other words, is there a danger of conflating dialogic democracy with 
majoritarianism? 
Secondly, although Hutchinson has a sophisticated conception of 
1 . . h . " . 1 d . "283 T · d anguage, It 1s more t an JUSt a socia me mm. o my mm , 
language also captures and refracts specific cultural norms and prac­
tices that are not always translatable.284 Hutchinson never considers 
whether the dialogue should be in a language other than english, for 
example french or First Nations languages. Indeed, some First 
Nations scholars have explicitly argued that 'equality' and 'justice', 
two concepts that are central to Hutchinson's project, are difficult 
278. W. Kymlicka, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality" (1 989) 99 Ethics 
883 at 900. 
279. Cora/, supra note 5 at 25. 
280. Ibid. at 122. 
281. Ibid. at 1 02-103. 
282. Ibid. at 180. 
283. Ibid. at 191. 
284. See also R.F. Devlin, "Law, Postmodernism and Resistance: Rethinking the 
Significance of The Irish Hunger Strike" (1 994) 14 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3 at 72-
73. 
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to fit within aboriginal world views. 285 While I do not want to 
overstate the incommensurability argument, it seems to me that 
this is not just a political or moral problem, which would be serious 
enough, but also an epistemological one that Hutchinson fails to 
consider. Furthermore, Hutchinson proposes that dialogism must 
remain continually open, but again there are at least two problems 
here: do most citizens really have that much time available? And at 
some point, some decisions have to be made, even relatively tem­
porary ones, and so some mechanisms for closure seem inevitable. 
Efficiency is not everything, but nor is it nothing. Hutchinson says 
little about the possibility and circumstances of closure. 
Finally, there is the important question of the relationship be­
tween dialogue and action. While it is true that dialogue can be a 
form of action, it is also an important limitation that it is only one 
form of action. If, as I have suggested, it is true that dialogism can­
not go far enough in its program of greater inclusion, the difficult 
question is, what are the oppressed to do when talking gets them 
nowhere? Towards the end of his book, Hutchinson flirts with the 
possibility of disruptive and activist tactics286 and the virtues of the 
"well placed Reebok."287 (Free corporate advertising?) The problem 
is that this discussion is much too brief because certain forms of 
action are in their nature silencing and therefore contradictory to 
the dialogic ethos. Are they thereby ruled out? Thus it seems .to me 
that Hutchinson finds himself in a difficult situation: as a self-de­
scribed radical he seeks dramatic social transformation; however, as 
a respectable university professor he cannot be perceived as advocat­
ing the direct action that might be required for such a project. In­
stead he opts for dialogic democracy, and indeed in his last few 
pages even waxes poetic.288 The problem with dialogism is its pri­
orization of dialogue over action. It conceives of politics as some­
how analogous to the almost perfect jurisprudence seminar where 
285. See e.g. Monture-Angus, supra note 125; and M. Turpel, "Patriarchy and 
Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for First Nations Women" (1993) 6 
C.J.W.L. 174 at 180. 
286. Coral, supra note 5 at 170. 
287, Ibi.d. at 224. 
288. Jbi.d. at 228-229. 
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each participant has his or her say and a thousand flowers bloom. 
Dialogue may be what academics do best, but is it the best possible 
strategy for those who are oppressed? Thus, in the same way that 
Hutchinson criticizes liberal legalism for being constitutively inca­
pable of achieving the social transformations necessary to enhance 
social justice, I suggest that democratic dialogism is similarly 
stymied. It too is both 'limited and limiting' as an effective strategy 
for achieving Hutchinson's expressed goal: radically egalitarian so­
cial reconstruction. 
In short, when we unpack it, I would suggest the premise underly­
ing the dialogic model is one of liberal contractualism - a regime of 
haggling, a world of offering and counteroffering, of giving and tak­
ing. But this is a deeply optimistic vision for, as Carol Pateman has 
pointed out, contract, rather than being the apotheosis of freedom 
and choice, might well be a highly refined form of subordination.289 
In other words, by taking refuge in dialogism I am not sure that 
H h. h d h "L k · 1 "290 utc mson as manage to escape t e oc ean soc1a contract 
theory of which he is so critical. 
Conclusion 
In Part I, I indicated that Beatty and Hutchinson shared certain 
commonalities: a belief in textual indeterminacy and a critique of 
the record of the Supreme Court of Canada. Let me conclude by 
suggesting two more: a failure to be sufficiently programmatic and 
the danger of decontextualism. 
On the programmatic side, Beatty seems to think that we are al­
most there, that with some minor tinkering and a judicial change of 
heart the integrity of law (and a socially just society) is within our 
grasp. But he has very little to say about how we might achieve 
289. C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) . 
290. Cora/, supra note 5 at 186. 
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such shifts. Hutchinson, on the other hand, argues that rights talk is 
taking us in the wrong direction and that large scale institutional 
and psychological transformations are urgently required. However, 
his proposed remedy of democratic dialogue seems to me to be 
unequal to the task of transition: Both authors have captured an 
important constitutional sensibility - Beatty the urge for auton­
omy and Hutchinson the craving for community - but each has 
failed to provide an account of how, in the short term, we might be 
able to make serious moves towards making either (or perhaps even 
both) sensibilities effectively achievable. Furthermore, there is the tendency towards decontextualism. 
Both books are written in a passionate style and this is an un­
doubted plus. However, each has a touch of the messianic and in 
their desire to proselytize they each may overstate their case. Law as 
a terrain of struggle is uneven and it provides different opportuni­
ties and constraints for different participants in its different forms, 
in different locations and at different times. Each author is aware of 
this but it is underplayed in their analyses. Legal theory, as it has 
been conventionally practiced, has a tendency to demand that an 
author must espouse some sort of coherent argument the robust­
ness of which should be compelling to all who might read it. But it 
may be that law itself is too messy, too complicated, too chaotic 
and too problematic to allow us to say yes or no. There may be no 
easy answers that can be captured by unidimensional appeals to ei­
ther universal principles or dialogic practices. But we should be 
grateful to both Beatty and Hutchinson for providing us with their 
respective visions: neither is compelling but both are thought pro­
voking. What more could we ask for? Truth? Eh? 
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